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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
It is a long established principle that “the law”— judicial 
opinions, statutes, and administrative regulations—is not copyrightable. 
This may seem like an intuitive principle or an obvious requirement in 
a society committed to democracy and the rule of law: if citizens are to 
                                                
1 J.D. Candidate, Mitchell Hamline School of Law, 2017; M.L.I.S., St. Catherine 
University, 2011; B.A. English, Macalester College, 2005. The author wishes to thank 
Minnesota's law and special librarian communities for furthering her interest in copyright 
law and for supporting her librarian-to-lawyer career change. The author also wishes to 
thank her family, especially Nick, for his daily supply of encouragement, cooking, and 
romantic walks with the dogg. 
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participate in creating law through democratic systems, they must be 
informed about the law. Furthermore, due process of law dictates that 
those subject to the rule of law must have access to the law if they are 
to be held responsible for complying with it.2 
However, the uncopyrightable nature of the law has been 
challenged many times in copyright infringement lawsuits. Even after 
many cases addressing the issue, the boundaries between what 
constitutes the law and is, therefore, uncopyrightable, and what is 
additional and, therefore, copyrightable, is not always clear. These 
issues are exacerbated by the history of legal publishing: various 
branches of the federal government and state governments have relied 
on private entities to publish public domain material.3 This created, and 
continues to create, a clash of interests between those private entities, 
who desire copyright protection for their works, and the public, who 
need access to the law that governs them. 
Currently, the state of Georgia is suing a non-profit, 
Public.Resource.org,4 for copyright infringement because the 
organization published an annotated version of the state’s code on its 
website.5 Public.Resource.org is arguing that since the annotated 
version is the state’s “official code,” the entirety of that code is the law 
and cannot be copyrighted.6 The issues are further complicated by a 
                                                
2 One scholar sees additional constitutional problems at the intersection of the 
government and copyright in allowing the copyrighting of works that were commissioned 
and funded by the government. See generally Andrea Simon, A Constitutional Analysis of 
Copyrighting Government-Commissioned Work, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 425 (1984).  
3 See Sarah Glassmeyer, State Legal Information Census: An Analysis of Primary State 
Legal Information, 23–27 (2016), 
http://www.sarahglassmeyer.com/StateLegalInformation/wp-
content/uploads/2014/04/GlassmeyerStateLegalInformationCensusReport.pdf (surveying 
publication of official state codes and court reporters by private entities and noting the 
frequent reliance on private entities for official publications). 
4 See About Us, PUBLIC.RESOURCE.ORG, https://public.resource.org/about/index.html 
(last visited May 14, 2016); Bylaws of Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 
PUBLIC.RESOURCE.ORG § 2.1, https://public.resource.org/public.resource.bylaws.html 
(last visited May 14, 2016) (“The objectives and purposes of Public.Resource.Org, Inc. 
shall be: to create, architect, design, implement, operate and maintain public works 
projects on the Internet for Educational, Charitable, and Scientific Purposes to the benefit 
of the general public and the public interest . . . .”). 
5 Compl. at 2, Code Revision Commission v. Public.Resource.org, Inc., No. 
1:15CV02594 (N.D. Ga. July 21, 2015). 
6 Answer at 24, 27, 28, Code Revision Commission v. Public.Resource.org, Inc., No. 
1:15CV02594 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 9, 2015); see also Bill Donahue, Nonprofit Group Says 
Georgia Code Can’t Be Copyrighted, LAW360 (Sept. 15, 2015, 4:56 PM), 
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private entity, LexisNexis (not currently a party to the lawsuit), that 
publishes and creates the annotations in the official code.7 
This Note will begin by surveying the history of the principle 
that the law is not copyrightable by looking at copyright of statutes and 
judicial opinions,8 copyright of material supplementing the text of the 
law,9 and, more recently, copyright of privately developed material 
adopted or incorporated into law.10 The Uniform Electronic Legal 
Materials Act (UELMA) will also be introduced as one way for states 
to move forward in providing authoritative access to the law without 
requiring the use of a private publisher’s product.11 Next, this Note will 
discuss the differing legal bases used in that history as a grounding for 
discussing the Public.Resource.org litigation.12 The allegations and 
arguments at issue in the Public.Resource.org litigation will then be 
described.13 Finally, a resolution to that litigation in favor of 
Public.Resource.org will be proposed, while recognizing that such an 
outcome is unlikely.14 
 
II. HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT AND “THE LAW” 
 
A. Copyright of Statutes and Judicial Opinions 
In the United States, the text of the law has long been 
considered to be in the public domain. The issue first reached the 
Supreme Court in 1834 in Wheaton v. Peters.15 Though the central 
issue of the case centered around who properly held the copyright in 
the content of reports of the Supreme Court’s decisions, the Court, at 
the very end of the majority opinion, and after disposing of the issues 
presented stated, “[i]t may be proper to remark that the court are 
unanimously of opinion, that no reporter has or can have any copyright 
                                                                                              
http://www.law360.com/articles/702797/nonprofit-group-says-georgia-code-can-t-be-
copyrighted. 
7 Compl. at 6, Code Revision Commission v. Public.Resource.org, Inc., No. 
1:15CV02594 (N.D. Ga. July 21, 2015). 
8 See infra Part II.A. 
9 See infra Part II.B. 
10 See infra Part II.C.1. 
11 See infra Part II.C.2. 
12 See infra Part III.A. 
13 See infra Part III.B.1. 
14 See infra Part III.B.2. 
15 See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834). 
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in the written opinions delivered by this court; and that the judges 
thereof cannot confer on any reporter any such right.”16 
The issue was more squarely confronted by the Court in Banks 
v. Manchester.17 A publisher, having received by contracting with the 
state of Ohio the exclusive right to publish reports of state court 
decisions, sought to prevent another from copying and publishing the 
decisions.18 The Court rejected the possibility of copyright in judicial 
decisions: 
Judges, as is well understood, receive from 
the public treasury a stated annual salary, fixed by 
law, and can themselves have no pecuniary interest or 
proprietorship, as against the public at large, in the 
fruits of their judicial labors. This extends to 
whatever work they perform in their capacity as 
judges, and as well to the statements of cases and 
head notes prepared by them as such, as to the 
opinions and decisions themselves. The question is 
one of public policy, and there has always been a 
judicial consensus, from the time of the decision in 
the case of Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591, that no 
copyright could under the statutes passed by 
Congress, be secured in the products of the labor 
done by judicial officers in the discharge of their 
judicial duties. The whole work done by the judges 
constitutes the authentic exposition and interpretation 
                                                
16 Id. at 668. Many later opinions and other commentators have described this as the 
holding of the case. See Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, Inc., 293 F.3d 791, 795 (5th 
Cir. 2002) (introducing the Wheaton Court’s statement on copyright of judicial opinions 
by saying “the Supreme Court interpreted the first federal copyright laws and 
unanimously held . . .”); Marvin J. Nodiff, Copyrightability of Works of the Federal and 
State Governments Under the 1976 Act, 29 ST. LOUIS L. J. 91, 99 (1984) (“In the historic 
case of Wheaton . . . , the Supreme Court held that federal court opinions are in the public 
domain.”). However, since the Court’s statement was made after disposing of the case at 
hand and was not essential to its decision about the necessity of following the formalities 
required by copyright statutes, it must be classified as dictum rather than a holding. See 
Irina Y. Dmitrieva, State Ownership of Copyrights in Primary Law Materials, 23 
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT L.J. 81, 84 (2000) (classifying the statement on copyright of the 
law as dictum and noting that the Court did not cite any legal authority for its 
proposition). The widespread adoption of the statement as a settled legal principle after 
Wheaton, however, shows that the principle is not open to dispute, despite its 
misunderstood beginning as a mere aside. 
17 See Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244 (1888). 
18 Id. at 247–48. 
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of the law, which, binding every citizen, is free for 
publication to all, whether it is a declaration of 
unwritten law, or an interpretation of a constitution or 
a statute.19 
The Banks v. Manchester court referred to a Massachusetts 
Supreme Court decision that made a similar public policy 
determination:  
[J]ustice requires that all should have free access to 
the opinions, and that it is against sound public policy 
to prevent this, or to suppress and keep from the 
earliest knowledge of the public the statutes, or the 
decisions and opinions of the Justices. Such opinions 
stand, upon principle, on substantially the same 
footing as the statutes enacted by the Legislature.20 
 
Soon after these early cases, Congress considered various 
proposals and recommendations about specifically excluding both 
federal and state judicial opinions, laws, and similar categories of legal 
material from being available for copyright. However, many of these 
recommendations were not adopted in the Copyright Act of 1909.21 The 
1909 Act only provided that “[n]o copyright shall subsist . . . in any 
publication of the United States Government,”22 therefore excluding 
state and local material and leaving open difficulties with the use of the 
word “publication.”23 
The current Copyright Act says that “[c]opyright protection 
under this title is not available for any work of the United States 
Government.”24 This retains the general principle of prohibition of 
                                                
19 Id. at 253–54 (citing Nash v. Lathrop, 142 Mass. 29, 35 (1886)). The Banks v. 
Manchester decision also emphasized that copyright could only belong to a citizen or 
resident of the United States, so the State did not qualify as an “author” under then-
current copyright statutes. Id. at 253. 
20 Nash v. Lathrop, 142 Mass. 29, 35 (1886). 
21 Nodiff, supra note 16, at 94–95. 
22 Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 7, 35 Stat. 1077 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 7 (1946)). 
23 See Nodiff, supra note 16, at 94–95 (reviewing the legislative history of the 1909 Act 
and finding that “publication” was neither defined in the Act nor clarified by the 
legislative history). 
24 17 U.S.C. § 105 (2012). Though the current text of § 105 effectively codifies that 
material such as federal statutes and judicial opinions is not copyrightable, it does not 
shed light on what effect that has on material added to the text of the law itself, such as 
annotations or page numbers. 
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copyright from the 1909 Act while switching to the concept of “work,” 
instead of “publication.”25 
Despite the absence of state and local law in the federal statute 
excluding government works from copyright protection,26 the common 
law principle that the law itself is not copyrightable is firmly 
established and has been since the late nineteenth century. Therefore, 
the principle that the words of a judicial opinion or statute are in the 
public domain would be safe from challenge regardless of whether a 
state has a statute parallel to the federal law embodied in § 105.27 
 
B. Copyright of Material Beyond the Text of Statutes and Judicial 
Opinions 
Although judicial decisions stating that the law is not 
copyrightable have been consistent with regard to the text of the law,28 
decisions about material beyond the text are more varied.29 However, it 
                                                
25 See Nodiff, supra note 16, at 94–95 (contrasting the 1909 Act with the 1976 Act, which 
used the term “work” instead of “publication” and defined “work of the United States 
Government”). 
26 State statutes vary greatly in addressing copyright of state government works. See 
generally Dmitrieva, supra note 16 (surveying state laws providing for copyright of 
primary law materials). 
27 As of 2000, according to one study reviewing state statutory provisions related to 
copyright of primary legal materials, Illinois was the only state explicitly placing its 
statutes in the public domain. Id. at 97. A more recent study reviewed copyright notices 
on websites containing such material and found that only Massachusetts specified that it 
claimed no copyright in the text of its case law. Glassmeyer, supra note 3, at 20. Of note 
to those interested in Georgia’s suit against Public.Resource.org, Georgia is last in 
Glassmeyer’s “Openness of Legal Information” rankings. Id. at 34–36; see infra Part 
III.B.1. 
28 One early case came to an opposite conclusion. See Gould v. Banks, 2 A. 886, 896 
(Conn. 1885) (“The judges and the reporter are paid by the state; and the product of their 
mental labor is the property of the state . . . . The courts and their records are open to all. 
The reasons given by the supreme court . . . constitute no part of the record therein.”). 
However, very soon after, another court refused to follow the decision. See State of 
Connecticut v. Gould, 34 F. 319, 320 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1888). The Connecticut court then 
concluded in 1892 that Gould could not be good law in light of Banks v. Manchester. See 
Peck v. Hooker, 23 A. 741, 742 (Conn. 1892). 
29 Compare W. Pub. Co. v. Mead Data Cent., Inc., 799 F.2d 1219, 1226-27 (8th Cir. 
1986) (concluding that West’s arrangement of judicial opinions is the result of 
considerable labor, talent, and judgment and thus meets the standard for intellectual-
creation), with Matthew Bender & Co. v. W. Pub. Co., 158 F.3d 693, 699 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(concluding that since “internal pagination of West's case reporters does not entail even a 
modicum of creativity, the volume and page numbers are not original components of 
West’s compilations and are not themselves protected by West’s compilation copyright”). 
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is generally established that copyright can subsist in elements that are 
original and additional to the uncopyrightable text itself, though what 
qualifies as original or additional has been contested. 
The history of copyright in material beyond the text of the law 
stretches back almost as far as the history of the lack of copyright in the 
law. In 1851, in Little v. Gould, the court acknowledged that no 
copyright existed in the judicial opinions themselves,30 but found that 
the state could copyright the volumes of court reports that included 
summaries of cases, headnotes, and other material.31 
A different court, in Davidson v. Wheelock, reached a parallel 
conclusion with regard to state constitutions and statutes, noting that 
such materials “are open to the world. They are public records, subject 
to inspection by every one.”32 Yet, a compilation or digest of those 
records “may be so original as to entitle the author to a copyright on 
account of the skill and judgment displayed in the combination and 
analysis.”33 
Later, that same court relied on Davidson to arrive at the same 
conclusion about state court reports34 that Little v. Gould35 had. The 
court further expounded on the policy basis for its decision by noting 
its importance in a just society:  
[I]t is a maxim of universal application that every 
man is presumed to know the law, and it would seem 
inherent that freedom of access to the laws, or the 
official interpretation of those laws, should be co-
extensive with the sweep of the maxim. Knowledge 
is the only just condition of obedience.36  
 
As further justification, the court called attention to the democratic 
system of government by describing citizens as “part owner[s]” of the 
laws: “[e]ach citizen is a ruler,—a law-maker,—and as such has the 
right of access to the laws he joins in making and to any official 
                                                
30 Little v. Gould, 15 F. Cas. 604, 606 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1851). 
31 Id. at 612. 
32 27 F. 61, 62 (C.C.D. Minn. 1866). 
33 Id. 
34 Banks & Bros. v. W. Pub. Co., 27 F. 50, 59 (C.C.D. Minn. 1886). 
35 Little v. Gould, 15 F. Cas. 604, 612 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1851); see supra notes 30–31 and 
accompanying text. 
36 Banks & Bros., 27 F. at 57. 
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interpretation thereof.”37 Several other courts subsequently reiterated 
the rule that although no copyright exists in statutes and judicial 
opinions, copyright can exist in original compilation and annotation 
materials added to those texts.38 
Although the precise scope of the availability of copyright in 
compilations of and material added to the law has been litigated many 
times, the suits generally center on whether the additional material or 
method of compilation was sufficiently original or creative to meet 
standards of copyrightability.39 These questions, unfortunately, do not 
directly shed light on the conflicted status of an annotated code that is 
also a state’s official code, which is at the heart of the suit between 
Georgia and Public.Resource.org.40 
 
C. Recent Issues: Laws Adopting Text Copyrighted by Private Parties 
and the Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act 
 
1. Laws Adopting Text Copyrighted by Private Parties: Veeck 
  
                                                
37 Id. It is interesting to notice that in this section of the opinion, the court does not 
provide any legal authority for the stated principles, other than observing that “[t]he laws 
of Rome were written on tablets and posted, that all might read, and all were bound to 
obedience” and acknowledging that “English courts generally sustain the crown’s 
proprietary rights in judicial opinions.” Id. 
38 See Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U.S. 617, 647–49 (1888); Howell v. Miller, 91 F. 129, 
138 (6th Cir. 1898); Ex Parte Brown, 78 N.E. 553, 558 (Ind. 1906). Harrison Co. v. Code 
Revision Commission, which is especially notable in light of the suit against 
Public.Resource.org for copying Georgia’s annotated code, see infra Part III.B, notes that 
even if the state had contracted for publication of an annotated version its code, the 
contracted publisher did not have an exclusive right to publish the laws since they were 
public records. 260 S.E.2d 30, 34 (Ga. 1979). In a related case, the state of Georgia 
argued that that it should be able to copyright its statutes so that it could insure accuracy 
in any published statutes, but the court rejected this argument and noted that “anyone 
citing the [unofficial version] will do so at his peril if there is any inaccuracy in that 
publication or any discrepancy between [the official version] and [the unofficial version]. 
A person takes the same risk, of course, whenever he cites the [unofficial versions of the 
United States code]; since both of these codifications are unofficial, the language in the 
statutes-at-large (or the official codifications) published by the Government Printing 
Office would control.” Georgia v. Harrison Co., 548 F. Supp. 110, 114–15 (N.D. Ga. 
1982), vacated, 559 F. Supp. 37 (N.D. Ga. 1983). 
39 See generally Deborah Tussey, Owning the Law: Intellectual Property Rights in 
Primary Law, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 173 (1998). 
40 See infra Part III. 
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What happens when the government adopts copyrighted 
material into law through incorporating the copyrighted text into law? 
This has been the question in more recent cases in the area of copyright 
and the content of the law. 
The First Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the topic in 
dictum when addressing a suit of Building Officials and Code 
Administrators (BOCA), a private organization that creates regulations 
for building construction.41 The BOCA Code was adopted in 
Massachusetts, and then the defendant published its own version of the 
State Code without recognition of BOCA’s copyright.42 The court 
reviewed the relevant cases43 and found that the differing lines of 
reasoning used in these opinions was significant enough to describe in 
detail: 
BOCA’s argument implies that the rule of Wheaton v. 
Peters was based on the public’s property interest in 
work produced by legislators and judges, who are, of 
course, government employees. This interpretation of 
the cases is not without foundation; there is language 
in some of them that emphasizes the inconsistency of 
private ownership of the law with its creation under 
government sponsorship. 
But BOCA’s argument overlooks another 
aspect of the ownership theory discussed in these 
cases. The cases hold that the public owns the law not 
just because it usually pays the salaries of those who 
draft legislation, but also because, in the language of 
Banks v. West, “Each citizen is a ruler,-a law-maker.” 
The citizens are the authors of the law, and therefore 
its owners . . . . 
Along with this metaphorical concept of 
citizen authorship, the cases go on to emphasize the 
very important and practical policy that citizens must 
have free access to the laws which govern them. This 
                                                
41 Bldg. Officials & Code Adm. v. Code Tech., Inc., 628 F.2d 730 (1st Cir. 1980). 
42 Id. at 732. 
43 See id. at 733–34. Many of the cases cited by the court are discussed previously in this 
Note. See supra Parts II.A–B.  
9
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policy is, at bottom, based on the concept of due 
process.44 
This detailed examination of the case law of the 
uncopyrightable nature of the law illustrates that, despite the 
consistency of the general rule of prohibition of copyright for such 
material, the reasoning behind the rule is not agreed upon among legal 
authorities.  
The status of copyrighted material adopted into law was again 
at issue in Veeck v. Southern Building Code Congress International, 
Inc.45 (“SBBCI”). The matter involved an individual who copied and 
distributed, via a free website, building codes that had been 
incorporated into municipal codes but were originally created by a 
private entity that owned the copyright in the codes.46 After receiving a 
cease-and-desist letter, Veeck sought a declaratory judgment declaring 
that he did not infringe SBCCI’s copyright.47  
The court held that privately drafted model codes lose their 
copyright protection when adopted by municipal or state 
governments.48 The court relied on the Supreme Court precedents in 
Wheaton49 and Banks v. Manchester.50 The court additionally relied on 
the merger doctrine—that the idea of the specific municipal building 
codes at issue can be expressed only through the precise words of the 
enacted code, rendering the words of the code uncopyrightable51—and 
                                                
44 Bldg. Officials & Code Adm., 628 F.2d at 734 (citations omitted). The inconsistent 
nature of the reasoning provided by courts in this area means that the law of copyright of 
primary legal information is less settled and less predictable than it first appears. See 
infra Part III.A. 
45 Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, Inc., 293 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc), cert. 
denied, 539 U.S. 969 (2003). See generally Shubha Ghosh, Copyright As Privatization: 
The Case of Model Codes, 78 TUL. L. REV. 653 (2004) (discussing the Veeck case in 
detail). 
46 Veeck, 293 F.3d at 793–94.  
47 Id. at 794. 
48 Id. at 800. 
49 Id. at 795, 798, 800 (citing Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834)); see supra 
notes 15–16 and accompanying text (discussing Wheaton). 
50 Veeck, 293 F.3d at 795–800; see supra notes 17–19 and accompanying text (discussing 
Banks v. Manchester). 
51 Veeck, 293 F.3d at 801. “In some circumstances, . . . a given idea is inseparably tied to 
a particular expression. In such instances, rigorously protecting the expression would 
confer a monopoly over the idea itself, in contravention of the statutory command. To 
prevent that consequence, courts have invoked the merger doctrine.” 4-13 Nimmer on 
Copyright § 13.03 (LexisAdvance, 2016). The merger doctrine is usually traced to Baker 
10
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on viewing the content of the codes as facts, which are 
uncopyrightable.52 Finally, the court resolved apparent conflicts 
between precedents in different circuits by distinguishing between 
standards and codes, saying that when standards were found to be 
copyrightable, the cases involved private standards that were 
incorporated by reference and “were created by private groups for 
reasons other than incorporation into law.”53 
The future of copyright in content created by private parties 
and subsequently incorporated into law is uncertain; one commentator 
noted that there is an unresolved circuit split.54 These cases have not 
brought much clarity to the field of copyrightability and the law when 
the official source of the law includes copyrighted material,55 but they 
do suggest that courts deciding such issues need to consider policy 
concerns about public access to the law.56 
 
2. The Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act: Making 
Authoritative Versions of the Law Accessible and Able to be 
Authenticated 
                                                                                              
v. Selden. 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1879); see also 1-2 Nimmer on Copyright § 2.18 
(LexisAdvance, 2016) (discussing Baker and noting that its discussion had drawn 
criticism in the scholarly literature). 
52 Veeck, 293 F.3d at 801. The touchstone cases for the rule that facts are uncopyrightable 
are Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344–45 (U.S. 
1991), and Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 556 
(1985). 
53 Veeck, 293 F.3d at 805. 
54 Lawrence A. Cunningham, Private Standards in Public Law: Copyright, Lawmaking 
and the Case of Accounting, 104 MICH. L. REV. 291, 300–07 (2005) (discussing the 
BOCA suit, Veeck, and others, while noting the limitations of the judiciary in addressing 
this area). 
55 These cases will likely be important in any decisions on the merits in suits involving 
Public.Resource.org’s copying of materials incorporating privately developed standards. 
See infra Part III.B.2. 
56 See Cunningham, supra note 54, at 297–98 (noting that the majority and dissent 
decisions in Veeck emphasized different aspects of competing policy objectives and the 
need for balancing of public policies in such cases); see generally also Nina A. 
Mendelson, Private Control over Access to the Law: The Perplexing Federal Regulatory 
Use of Private Standards, 112 MICH. L. REV. 737 (2014) (arguing, in the context of 
private standards incorporated into regulatory schemes, that access to the law needs to be 
better and easier for reasons beyond public policy concerns, such as that regulatory 
beneficiaries need notice of the contents of standards and that the public needs to be able 
to invoke mechanisms of accountability, including voting, contacting Congress, 
participating in agency procedures, and seeking judicial review). 
11
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Although the law is not copyrightable, it is sometimes only 
available in its official57 form through a product that contains additional 
copyrightable material, such as a print volume of a court reporter58 or 
state statutes59 that includes annotations. Another hurdle to the public 
accessing the law is the potential for confusion about whether a 
particular version is official, and can be relied on as authoritative, or 
not.60 
                                                
57 “The word ‘official’ means that the text of the statutes is the legal evidence of the law 
in a court of law.” NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, OFFICIAL VERSION 
OF THE STATE STATUTES/CODE (March–July 2011), 
http://www.ncsl.org/documents/lsss/Official_Version_Statutes.pdf. 
58 Every volume of West’s National Reporter System is an example of this. See 
THOMSON REUTERS, USING WEST’S NATIONAL REPORTER SYSTEM (2010), 
http://lscontent.westlaw.com/images/content/nationalreporter10.pdf. 
59 Note, for example, that both official and unofficial print versions of Minnesota’s state 
code exist. A set of books entitled Minnesota Statutes is published by the Minnesota 
Revisor’s office and is an official version. Minnesota Statutes: Official Versions of 
Minnesota Statutes, OFFICE OF THE REVISOR OF STATUTES, 
https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes?view=info (last visited May 14, 2016). Minnesota 
Statutes Annotated is published by Thomson Reuters. Minnesota Statutes Annotated, 
THOMSON REUTERS, http://legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com/law-
products/Statutes/Minnesota-Statutes-Annotated-Annotated-Statute--Code-
Series/p/100028621 (last visited May 14, 2016). Minnesota Statutes Annotated is not 
listed as an official version of Minnesota Statutes. See Minnesota Statutes: Official 
Versions of Minnesota Statutes, OFFICE OF THE REVISOR OF STATUTES, 
https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes?view=info (last visited May 14, 2016). 
60 See CODE OF GEORGIA - FREE PUBLIC ACCESS, http://www.lexis-
nexis.com/hottopics/gacode/Default.asp (last visited May 14, 2016). This portal to 
Georgia’s code is entitled “Code of Georgia – Free Public Access”; it states that the 
“website is maintained by LexisNexis®, the publisher of the Official Code of Georgia 
Annotated, to provide free public access to the law.” Id. But this language does not make 
it clear whether or not this online version is designated as an official version, and so 
lawyers needing an official version because they will use the text in legal proceedings 
should be wary. See id. This website formerly included language that specified that only 
the print version was authoritative, but this author was unable to locate that language; 
perhaps it has been removed in light of the litigation described in this Note. See Answer 
at 24, Code Revision Commission v. Public.Resource.org, Inc., No. 1:15CV02594 (N.D. 
Ga. Sept. 14, 2015) (referring to Exhibit F, a screenshot of a previous version of the 
portal’s entry page); see also infra Part III.B.1. Once a user clicks the “I Agree” button 
and begins to view the material, the beginning search page refers to the material as 
“Official Code of Georgia,” but when viewing a specific code section, the heading on the 
page only mentions the code’s “official” status through the presence of O.C.G.A. 
citations, which are followed by a heading that merely says “Georgia Code.” See CODE 
OF GEORGIA - FREE PUBLIC ACCESS, http://www.lexis-
nexis.com/hottopics/gacode/Default.asp (last visited May 14, 2016) (noting that the 
search page and specific code sections not available via direct link and a user of any of 
these pages must begin at this cited portal and accept the Terms & Conditions). The text 
12
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The Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (“UELMA”) is 
an attempt to fix these problems by requiring states that adopt such 
legislation to provide online versions of legal material that are as 
authoritative as the print versions historically relied on.61 “The Act 
requires that official electronic legal material be: (1) authenticated, by 
providing a method to determine that it is unaltered; (2) preserved, 
either in electronic or print form; and (3) accessible, for use by the 
public on a permanent basis.”62 The authentication aspect is key; some 
states previously offered official versions online, but these versions 
were not authenticated and therefore were open to question about their 
accuracy.63 The authentication aspect may seem unimportant to the lay 
user, but attorneys downloading copies of statutes, or receiving such 
downloaded copies from others, and using the documents in legal 
proceedings should be able to know, through the authentication 
process, that the text on which they are relying is accurate.64 
                                                                                              
of Georgia’s code does not provide further clarity; the only provision about publishing an 
official code is that “[t]he Code Revision Commission shall provide for the publication of 
the Official Code of Georgia Annotated . . . .” O.C.G.A. § 28-9-5(a), current through the 
2015 Regular Session. This is in contrast to a state like Minnesota, which is more explicit 
about how one knows whether a version is authoritative and can be used in legal 
proceedings: “Any volume of Minnesota Statutes, supplement to Minnesota Statutes, and 
Laws of Minnesota certified by the revisor according to section 3C.11, subdivision 1, is 
prima facie evidence of the statutes contained in it in all courts and proceedings.” MINN. 
STAT. § 3C.13 (2014). 
61 Electronic Legal Material Act: Description, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Electronic+Legal+Material+Act (last visited 
May 14, 2016). 
62 Id. 
63 RICHARD J. MATTHEWS & MARY A. BAISH, STATE-BY-STATE REPORT ON 
AUTHENTICATION OF ONLINE LEGAL RESOURCES 3 (Am. Ass’n of Law Libraries 
2007)(“A significant number of the state online legal resources are official but none are 
authenticated or afford ready authentication by standard methods. State online primary 
legal resources are therefore not sufficiently trustworthy.”). Authenticated, and therefore 
trustworthy, sources are important for those engaging with the legal system; recall the 
warning in Georgia v. Harrison Co. that one citing an unofficial version “[did] so at his 
peril if there is any inaccuracy . . . or any discrepancy between [official and unofficial 
versions].” 548 F. Supp. 110, 114 (N.D. Ga. 1982) vacated, 559 F. Supp. 37 (N.D. Ga. 
1983). 
64 See, e.g., Document Authentication, OFFICE OF THE REVISOR OF STATUTES, 
https://www.revisor.mn.gov/pubs/publish_hash.php?type=statutes&id=3E.02 (last 
viewed Jan. 9, 2016) (providing an example of an authentication process in which a user 
can upload the document she is using as her source of the law and find out whether it is 
an authentic copy). 
13
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UELMA has been adopted in twelve states and has been 
introduced in two more.65 UELMA is quite flexible66: states can include 
or exclude certain categories of legal information,67 there is no specific 
technology designated by the Act, and, though only a unit or employee 
of the state government can be the official publisher, states can still 
contract with commercial publishers to produce official versions.68 
There does not appear to have been any litigation as of yet about 
whether or not a state’s implementation properly complies with the 
legislation or what ramifications a state’s adoption of UELMA has on 
copyright issues.69  
Depending on how a state implements UELMA,70 it can avoid 
clashes between the interests of private publishers of legal information 
and the public with respect to the availability of official versions of the 
state’s laws because the public does not have to use a private 
                                                
65 Electronic Legal Material Act: Description, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Electronic+Legal+Material+Act (last visited 
May 14, 2016). 
66 See Uniform Electronic Legal Material Act Summary, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Electronic%20Legal%20Material%
20Act (last visited May 14, 2016). 
67 Minnesota, for example, includes its Constitution, session laws, codified statutes, and 
administrative rules in its adoption of UELMA, but does not include judicial opinions. 
See MINN. STAT. 3E.02 (2014). 
68 Uniform Electronic Legal Material Act Summary, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Electronic%20Legal%20Material%
20Act (last visited May 14, 2016). 
69 This author did not check each statute derived from UELMA in each adopting state for 
citing court cases. However, WestlawNext searches by this author on January 28, 2016, 
of all state and federal cases for the terms and phrases “UELMA,” “electronic legal 
materials act,” and “electronic legal material” did not return any relevant cases; in all 
searches but the last phrase, there were no cases. 
70 The argument has been made that UELMA may turn out to be ineffective and that 
Georgia’s current online statutes could be found to meet UELMA’s requirements of 
authentication, preservation, and accessibility. Beth Ford, Note, Open Wide the Gates of 
Legal Access, 93 OR. L. REV. 539, 562–63 (2014). However, before concluding that a 
state like Georgia has met the Uniform Act’s requirements even without adopting it, a 
more detailed analysis would be required, especially on the question of whether 
Georgia’s online code is authenticated, since authenticated is different from official, see 
supra note 63, and there are not currently any statements or functions related to 
authentication on the O.C.G.A. website. See supra note 60 (describing the information 
presented to a user of the O.C.G.A. online). However, the fact remains that despite the 
promotion of access to legal information through the creation of UELMA and despite its 
adoption in some states, there are still significant barriers to access to reliable legal 
information, even in states that have adopted UELMA. See GLASSMEYER, supra note 3, 
at 1, 3. 
14
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publisher’s product to access version that is both official and 
authenticated. Georgia has not adopted UELMA71 and continues to 
have a close relationship with a private entity for publication of its 
official code,72 so the state has created confusion and issues for itself 
and users of its code by outsourcing its publishing and designating an 
annotated code as the official version. 
 
III. THE PUBLIC.RESOURCE.ORG SUIT: AN OPPORTUNITY TO 
SUPPORT PUBLIC ACCESS TO THE LAW 
A. Differing Legal Bases of Uncopyrightability of the Law 
The history of copyright in the text of statutes, judicial 
opinions, and in material added to those texts, along with recent 
developments in cases like Veeck and in legislation like UELMA, 
shows that copyright of the law is still unsettled territory, even amidst 
general consistency about the principle that the law is uncopyrightable. 
Another layer of complication is that courts discussing the 
uncopyrightability of the law are not entirely consistent in how they 
ground that principle,73 making predicting the outcome of suits on the 
subject even more difficult than usual.74 
Some courts emphasize the fact that the government is like the 
employee of the people, and thus the law (and sometimes government 
works more generally) belongs to the people under principles 
reminiscent of work made for hire.75 A work made for hire exists when 
                                                
71 Electronic Legal Material Act: Description, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Electronic+Legal+Material+Act (last visited 
May 14, 2016). 
72 Compl. at 7–8, Code Revision Commission v. Public.Resource.org, Inc., No. 
1:15CV02594 (N.D. Ga. July 21, 2015). As discussed below, it is interesting that the state 
of Georgia has brought suit to protect the copyright owned by LexisNexis, a private 
entity. See infra Part III.B.1. 
73 Additionally, some of the early cases that became important precedents in this area, see 
supra Parts II.A and II.B, are lacking in any reasoning on which to base their 
conclusions. See Davidson v. Wheelock, 27 F. 61, 62 (C.C.D. Minn. 1866); Wheaton v. 
Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834). 
74 An additional consideration is the more fundamental problem, from a constitutional 
separation of powers perspective, of judicial branches making public policy judgments, 
when “public policy pronouncements are a unique prerogative of the legislative branch.” 
Dmitrieva, supra note 16, at 117. 
75 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“A ‘work made for hire’ is—(1) a work prepared by an employee 
within the scope of his or her employment; or (2) a work specially ordered or 
commissioned for use [in specific categories of works], if the parties expressly agree in a 
15
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an employee who creates a copyrightable work does not own the 
copyright; instead, the employer owns it.76 The Court in Banks v. 
Manchester calls out this idea, noting that judges are paid out of the 
public treasury.77 
Other courts focus on public policy, democratic ideals of an 
informed populace, and due process concerns that require people to 
have access to the laws that govern them, while stating that the law is 
not copyrightable and exists in the public domain. The court in Nash v. 
Lathrop simply thought that “justice requires” such access.78 In Banks 
& Brothers v. West Publishing Co., the court noted the “maxim” that 
all are presumed to know the law, so it is only just that all have access 
to the law.79 The court also called attention to each citizen’s role as a 
“law-maker,” which is the result of a democracy dependent on the 
participation of the public.80 
Some courts discuss both lines of reasoning and are unclear 
about which is the main basis for their holdings. Even in its description 
of the relationship between the work product of government officials 
and the public, Banks v. Manchester, when it highlighted that the law is 
“binding [on] every citizen,” seemed to suggest that due process 
principles are at play.81 The cases dealing with privately created codes 
adopted into law acknowledge the varying reasonings used in the 
relevant precedents but do little to resolve whether one or another is 
superior.82  
                                                                                              
written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for 
hire.”); see also 1-5 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 5.13 (LexisAdvance 2016) (summarizing 
the law of copyright and works of the United States government and the work made for 
hire concepts involved). 
76 See 1-5 NIMMER, supra note 75. 
77 Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244, 253 (1888); see also supra notes 17–20 and 
accompanying text. 
78 142 Mass. 29, 35 (1886). 
79 27 F. 50, 57 (C.C.D. Minn. 1886); see also supra notes 34 and accompanying text. 
80 Banks & Bros. v. W. Pub. Co., 27 F. at 57; see also supra notes 37 and accompanying 
text. This statement could also be interpreting as conjuring work made for hire principles, 
with the citizen as employer and the government as employee, so it could be argued that 
this reasoning fits in the first category. See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text 
(discussing the use of work made for hire-like principles in cases concerning copyright of 
the law). 
81 Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244, 253–54 (1888) (citing Nash v. Lathrop, 142 Mass. 
29, 35 (1886)) (noting that the law is “binding on every citizen”). 
82 See Bldg. Officials & Code Adm. v. Code Tech., Inc., 628 F.2d 730, 734 (1st Cir. 
1980); Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, Inc., 293 F.3d 791, 800–05 (5th Cir. 2002) (en 
16
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Of these differing foci of reasoning, the second, emphasizing 
democratic ideals and due process principles, is the better one; it 
upholds the central importance of having the law in the public domain 
in the United States and avoids possible loopholes in the work made for 
hire analogy. Grounding the uncopyrightability of the law in due 
process and democratic principles means that government units, such as 
state legislatures, must consider their official, authoritative versions of 
laws as being in the public domain. 
The varied reasoning used by courts suggests that the 
reasoning is not important. Perhaps courts assume that the principle is 
so obvious and, at this point, firmly established that it is not necessary 
to carefully identify the legal basis for the proposition. However, the 
reasoning used to place the law in the public domain could have 
implications for whether or not certain material is determined to be in 
the public domain. 
For example, if work made for hire principles are used,83 and 
judges and legislators are considered employees, and the public are 
viewed as employers for works created by government officials in their 
official capacities, the public owns the copyright in such works. 
However, this reasoning could have unintended limits. A United States 
citizen who is not a resident or tax-payer in a particular state might not 
be considered as included in the public owning the copyrights to 
government works created by that state’s judges and legislators, and 
that person, unlike a person who lives in that state, would be infringing 
on the copyright of that state if he engaged in infringing conduct.84 
Additionally, whether or not a corporation would be included 
in “the public” that owns the copyrights could be another source of 
problems. If corporations are people for such purposes, in what state do 
the corporations participate in the ownership of government works? 
Could they claim such ownership in more than one state? Can human 
persons who pay taxes in several states do so? Which taxes trigger such 
ownership? Many benefits of governments are only given to residents 
or other specific members of the public; use of the law could be argued 
to be no different. 
                                                                                              
banc), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 969 (2003); see also supra notes 44, 48–53 and 
accompanying text (discussing reasoning in Bldg. Officials & Code Adm. and Veeck). 
83 See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text. 
84 See Dmitrieva, supra note 16, at 113–14 (arguing that this “metaphorical concept of 
citizen authorship” is not the best model and is impractical in the United States of today). 
17
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What happens if the government, the employee of the people, 
did not write the law? Is the public’s rightful access to the law lessened 
when government representatives only did the work of enacting a 
particular law, but did not create it? This is the issue in the BOCA and 
Veeck cases, but the answers to these questions still are not clear.85 The 
public policy concern shown in these cases could be a justification for 
why Georgia should lose its lawsuit86: if the state is designating 
material as its official law, even if that material would otherwise be 
copyrightable, then it is not subject to copyright, as in Veeck. 
All of these issues suggest that the public domain status of 
statutes and judicial decisions is more safely maintained by the public 
policy and due process reasoning used by the Court in Nash v. 
Lathrop87 and like cases.88 That reasoning more reliably promotes 
public access of the law and other government information. It also 
places the burden on states and other would-be copyright owners, such 
as publishers of legal information, to show why denying public domain 
status of the law and material associated with the text of the law does 
not offend principles of democracy and due process. The alternative is 
to place the burden on the public to show why particular material is of 
the type of material that the public has a right to have through a work 
made for hire relationship with the government. 
 
B. Resolving Code Revision Commission v. Public.Resource.org, Inc. 
 
1. Facts and Allegations of Case. 
 
Code Revision Commission v. Public.Resource.org, Inc.89 is 
an opportunity for a court to provide greater support of public access to 
the law and greater clarity in the reasoning underlying that policy. The 
suit highlights the problems and confusion that can arise when a state 
offers an official version of its code only through using a private 
publisher’s products or services and designates an annotated code as its 
official code. 
                                                
85 See supra Part II.C.2; see also generally Ghosh, supra note 45. 
86 See infra Part III.B.2. 
87 Nash v. Lathrop, 142 Mass. 29, 35 (1886). 
88 See Banks & Bros. v. W. Pub. Co., 27 F. 50, 57 (C.C.D. Minn. 1886); see also supra 
notes 78–90 and accompanying text (discussing reasoning in Nash and Banks). 
89 No. 1:15CV02594 (N.D. Ga. filed July 21, 2015). 
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This is not Public.Resource.org’s first time in court, or its first 
time in court over an alleged copyright infringement of legal materials. 
The organization has recently been in litigation to obtain Internal 
Revenue Service records and to defend against infringement actions 
arising out of publishing federal and state regulations online.90 
On July 21, 2015, the Code Revision Commission, on behalf 
of the State of Georgia, filed suit against Public.Resource.org, claiming 
violations of the Copyright Act,91 because of Public.Resource.org’s 
“systemic, widespread and unauthorized copying and distribution of the 
copyrighted annotations in the Official Code of Georgia Annotated.”92 
                                                
90 Public.Resource.org v. U. S. Internal Revenue Serv., 78 F. Supp. 3d 1262, 1268 (N.D. 
Cal. 2015) (granting summary judgment to Public.Resource.org and requiring the 
government to produce requested documents); Am. Educ. Research Ass’n, Inc. v. 
Public.Resource.org, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 3d 542, 551 (D.D.C. 2015) (striking 
Public.Resource.org’s demand for a jury trial in suit for infringement of plaintiffs’ 
copyright in educational and psychological testing standards incorporated into the Code 
of Federal Regulations and state laws; suit is ongoing); Am. Soc’y for Testing & 
Materials v. Public.Resource.org, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 3d 534, 542 (D.D.C. 2015) (striking 
Public.Resource.org’s demand for a jury trial in suit for infringement of plaintiffs’ 
copyright in safety codes and standards incorporated by state and local governments into 
statutes, regulations, and ordinances; suit is ongoing); see also Tim Cushing, 
Public.Resource.Org Sued (Again) For Publication Of A Document Incorporated Into 
Federal Regulations [Update], TECHDIRT (May 29, 2014, 3:29 AM), 
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140526/17193727368/publicresourceorg-sued-again-
publication-document-incorporated-into-federal-regulations.shtml (discussing the 
American Education Research Association suit and providing links to articles about other 
Public.Resource.org suits); Victor Li, Who Owns the Law? Technology Reignites the War 
Over Just How Public Documents Should Be, ABA J. (Jun. 2014), available at 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/who_owns_the_law_technology_reignites_t
he_war_over_just_how_public_document (reviewing the career of Public.Resource.org 
founder Carl Malamud and discussing differing viewpoints on Malamud’s tactics and 
recent litigation). 
91 Compl. at 14, Code Revision Commission v. Public.Resource.org, Inc., No. 
1:15CV02594 (N.D. Ga. July 21, 2015) (claiming violations “of one or more of Sections 
106, 501–503, and 505 of the Copyright Act”). The Commission had previously sent 
Public.Resource.org a “Cease and Desist” letter, id. Exhibit 4, to which 
Public.Resource.org responded and stated that it “respectfully reject[ed] the distinction 
between ‘the statutory text itself’ and additional materials, as both are integral part and 
parcel of the only Official Code of Georgia Annotated, such material constituting the 
official law as published by the State.” Id. Exhibit 5. 
92 Compl. at 2, Code Revision Commission, No. 1:15CV02594. Note that the content 
provided by Public.Resource.org therefore goes beyond what is provided online for free 
through the Georgia legislature’s portal to the O.C.G.A., which, despite often using 
O.C.G.A. as its title, does not provide any of the annotations, so it is the annotations that 
are at the center of this dispute. See sources cited supra note 60. The Complaint specifies 
that the Commission does not and could not assert copyright in the statutory text itself. 
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Specifically, the Commission alleges that Public.Resource.org has 
“copied at least 140 volumes/supplements containing the O.C.G.A. 
Copyrighted Annotations” and posted these works “on at least one of 
its websites.”93 Further copying was alleged through posting of the 
material on another website, to which Public.Resource.org indicated 
that it was the owner of the works, resulting in many downloads of the 
annotations,94 and through distribution of USB drives containing copies 
of the annotations.95 The Commission additionally alleged that 
Public.Resource.org has created unauthorized derivative works in a 
manner that “encourg[es] the creation of further [such] works.”96 The 
Commission is seeking injunctive relief, as well as attorneys’ fees and 
costs.97 
The Complaint describes Public.Resource.org and its founder, 
Carl Malamud, as engaged in “a larger plan designed to challenge the 
letter of U.S. copyright law and force government entities . . . to expend 
tax payer dollars in creating annotated codes and making those 
annotated codes easily accessible.”98  
The Commission’s view of the problem is that if the 
annotations to its code are freely available online, the publisher, 
LexisNexis, will not be able to sell copies of the annotated code, 
causing “Georgia [to] be required to either stop publishing the 
annotations altogether or pay for development of the annotations using 
state tax dollars.”99 In this way, the Commission has framed itself as 
the defender of the public, who will eventually lose the annotations as a 
                                                                                              
Compl. at 8, Code Revision Commission, No. 1:15CV02594. The Complaint further 
describes the free online access that is available and states that LexisNexis is required to 
publish that resource by the terms of its contract with the State. Id. 
93 Id. at 9. 
94 Id. at 9–10. 
95 Id. at 12–13. 
96 Id. at 2, 9. 
97 Id. at 16–17. 
98 Id. at 10–11; see also Mike Masnick, State Of Georgia Sues Carl Malamud For 
Copyright Infringement For Publishing The State’s Own Laws, TECHDIRT (Jul. 24, 2015, 
6:10AM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20150723/17125231743/state-georgia-sues-
carl-malamud-copyright-infringement-publishing-states-own-laws.shtml (complaint 
available for viewing). The Complaint and Exhibits also detail Malamud’s previous 
copying of government and legal information. Id. at 11. 
99 Compl. at 2–3, Code Revision Commission v. Public.Resource.org, Inc., No. 
1:15CV02594 (N.D. Ga. July 21, 2015). 
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resource if Public.Resource.org is allowed to continue its posting of 
annotations.100 
The Complaint specifies that the annotations are only added in 
the annotated publication and are not enacted law.101 The Complaint 
also details the process of creating the annotations102 and the specifics 
of the contractual arrangement between the State of Georgia and 
LexisNexis, which include that the annotations and other original 
works are works made for hire and the copyright in them is owned by 
the Commission.103 
Public.Resource.org’s Answer admitted many of the 
allegations about what it had done with the annotations in the O.C.G.A. 
but denied that the Commission owns a valid copyright in the 
annotations104 and further denied “the bizarre, defamatory, and 
gratuitous allegation that it has a ‘strategy of terrorism.’”105 The 
Answer raised ten affirmative defenses.106 The second defense stated 
that the O.C.G.A. is in the public domain and not copyrightable subject 
matter and further reiterated Public.Resource.org’s position that the 
State “has no copyrights in works that government entities have 
enacted as law” and that “[t]he O.C.G.A. including annotations, 
regardless of how they were authored, is the law of Georgia, and the 
law should be free to the public.”107 The ninth and tenth defenses 
directly addressed the Commission’s request for an injunction by 
stating that there should be no injunction because of a lack of 
irreparable injury and because it would be against the public interest.108 
Public.Resource.org went on to counterclaim and seek a 
declaratory judgment that its actions do not infringe any copyright.109 
The counterclaim outlined Mr. Malamud’s contributions to public 
                                                
100 See id. at 2–3. 
101 Id. at 7. 
102 Id. at 6–7. 
103 Id. at 7–8. The state’s ownership of the copyrights explains why the publisher is not 
the complaining party in this litigation, as it has been in other cases. See infra Part II.B. 
104 See generally, Answer and Counterclaims, Code Revision Commission v. 
Public.Resource.org, Inc., No. 1:15--2594 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 14, 2015). 
105 Id. at 7.  
106 Id.at 10–11. 
107 Id. at 10. 
108 Id. at 11. 
109 Id. at 12. 
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access to government information,110 as well as the non-profit 
contributions of Public.Resource.org.111 
The counterclaim also describes language in the O.C.G.A’s 
annotations that warned against using a different, unofficial version of 
Georgia’s statutes.112 Public.Resource.org then describes the restrictive 
conditions of using the online version of the O.C.G.A. and again calls 
attention to its unofficial status,113 including providing an exhibit 
showing the website portal to the O.C.G.A. with language specifying 
that the print version is the authoritative version.114 
Public.Resource.org further outlines a view of the law that 
relies on authorship by the people and requires public availability under 
principles of the rule of law generally, the lack of a defense of 
ignorance of the law, and the Constitution’s protections of people 
reading and communicating the law.115 Public.Resource.org argues that 
Georgia has incorporated the annotations and other material beyond the 
legislatively enacted text by incorporating that material in its official 
version of the Code, and thus use of that material by others “is lawful 
through the doctrine of merger.”116 Additionally, Public.Resource.org 
claims that “[e]ven if copyright law protected authorship by private 
parties after it is incorporated into law, . . . [its] use of the complete 
O.C.G.A. is fair use.”117 
The Commission answered the counterclaim118 and filed an 
Amended Complaint; the only substantive difference from the first 
Complaint is that, at allegation 18, the Commission alleged that 
Public.Resource.org has “copied at least 52 different 
volumes/supplements containing the 2015 O.C.G.A. Copyrighted 
                                                
110 Id. at 14–18. 
111 Id. at 19–21. 
112 Id. at 22–23. 
113 Id. at 23–24. 
114 Id. at 24 (referring to Exhibit F, a screenshot of a previous version of the portal’s entry 
page); see also supra note 60. 
115 Id. at 25–26. 
116 Id. at 26–27; see also supra note 51 (discussing the merger doctrine). 
117 Id. at 27. “[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work . . . for purposes such as criticism, 
comment, news reporting, teaching, . . . scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of 
copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair 
use” four factors will be considered. 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
118 Answer to Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim, Code Revision Commission v. 
Public.Resource.org, Inc., No. 1:15-cv-2594 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 8, 2015). 
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Annotations” since the initial filing of the suit.119 Public.Resource.org 
has filed an Answer to the Amended Complaint incorporating a 
response to the new allegation that mirrors its previous assertions of 
having done the copying alleged but denying that the material at issue 
was protected by copyright.120 
There has been no substantive filings beyond the pleadings; as 
of this writing, the parties had begun discovery in the midst of filing the 
amended pleadings.121 
 
2. How the Case Should Be Decided 
As of March 23, 2016, the parties in Code Revision 
Commission v. Public.Resource.org, Inc. have not yet filed any motions 
that would resolve any of the claims, so it is currently unknown exactly 
how they will frame their arguments and what legal authorities they 
will rely on.122 
It seems likely that the Commission will largely rely on cases 
that distinguish between the text of the law and supplemental material 
and specify that the former is not copyrightable but the latter is.123 
Narrowly focusing on and following the cases that hold supplemental 
material copyrightable124 has an appealing simplicity and would avoid 
sending states that have arrangements like Georgia’s125 scrambling to 
                                                
119 Amended Complaint, Code Revision Commission v. Public.Resource.org, Inc., No. 
1:15CV02594 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 8, 2015). 
120 Answer to Amended Complaint and Counterclaim, Code Revision Commission v. 
Public.Resource.org, Inc., No. 1:15CV02594 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 22, 2015). 
121 See Code Revision Commission v. Public.Resource.org, Inc., No. 1:15CV02594 (N.D. 
Ga.) (including docket entry 12, Joint Preliminary Report and Discovery Plan; entry 13, a 
Scheduling Order for discovery to end on March 18, 2016; entries 14 and 15, Certificates 
of Service of initial disclosures by each party; and entries 20 through 25, Certificates of 
Service by both parties of responses and objections to interrogatories and requests for 
production of documents). 
122 See Code Revision Commission v. Public.Resource.org, Inc., No. 1:15CV02594 (N.D. 
Ga.). 
123 See supra Part II.B. 
124 See supra Part II.B. 
125 For example, it appears that South Dakota also uses a private publisher for its official 
version of its print code. See South Dakota Codified Laws, 
LEGALSOLUTIONS.THOMSONREUTERS.COM, 
http://legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com/law-products/Primary-Law-Materials-CasesC-
Codes-/South-Dakota-Codified-Laws-Annotated-Statute--Code-Series/p/100001432 (last 
visited May 14, 2016) (specifying that the books are published “under an exclusive 
contract with the South Dakota Code Commission”). South Dakota does publish its 
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address the implications of needing to provide versions beyond what 
they currently provide and the implications of having contractual 
obligations with private publishers that are irreconcilable with the 
court’s holding. 
In countering the Commission’s precedent-based argument, 
Public.Resource.org would likely be successful if it analogized this 
litigation to cases holding that material adopted into a code, even if 
privately created and otherwise copyrightable, is not copyrightable.126  
The most difficult part of the Commission’s argument will be 
carefully defining the meaning of the term “official” in light of 
Georgia’s code publication arrangements and addressing the 
implications of the State of Georgia having designated an annotated 
version as its official version. 
To highlight the importance of the meaning of “official” and 
to offer its own appealingly simple conclusion, Public.Resource.org 
will likely argue that designating a version of a legal code as “official” 
encompasses the entirety of that version, thus putting it into the public 
domain. Further, Public.Resource.org may try to draw attention to the 
uncomfortable position that the Commission is inescapably supporting: 
that the onus is on a reader of the O.C.G.A. to differentiate between 
which bits of text are official and uncopyrightable and which are not 
official and are copyrightable. This position gives a bad taste in a 
country where the law is not copyrightable, which may cause a judge or 
jury to be very hesitant to accept the Commission’s position. 
Yet, from a broader perspective of anticipating similar issues 
in the future, Public.Resource.org would benefit more from 
concentrating on convincing a judge or jury to take a broader view of 
the case and focus on the reasoning behind the uncopyrightability of the 
law. This could be a difficult path if the judge is not receptive to public 
policy arguments, but Public.Resource.org may have an easier time 
                                                                                              
statutes online, but it is unclear from the website whether or not it is an official version. 
See Codified Laws, SOUTH DAKOTA LEGISLATURE LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COUNCIL, 
http://legis.sd.gov/statutes/Codified_Laws/ (last visited May 14, 2016). Chapter 2-16, 
“Codes and Compilations,” of South Dakota Codified Laws does not appear to provide 
for the online publication of its code. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 2-16-3 et seq. (West, 
WestlawNext through 2015 Regular Session). See also Statutes/Code: Publisher and 
Frequency of Printing, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Jul. 2011), 
http://www.ncsl.org/documents/lsss/Publisher_Printed_Statutes.pdf (listing publishers of 
each state’s printed code: legislature, state, revisor, Lexis/Nexis, and/or Thompson [sic] 
Reuters (West)). 
126 See supra Part II.B.1. 
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bringing in such arguments because arguments about public policy and 
democratic ideals have previously influenced decisions about copyright 
and the law.127 
Even a judge not otherwise responsive to public policy 
arguments could reach a result that takes the various public policy 
concerns into account because the BOCA case and Veeck both 
discussed and placed significant importance in these arguments. 
Although those cases are not in the same federal appellate circuit as 
Georgia,128 they have persuasive value both as cases decided in federal 
appellate courts and as issues that involved the intersection of copyright 
of material created by a private entity and copyright of the law. 
Public.Resource.org should additionally attack the 
Commission’s description of the way it and the public will be harmed if 
Public.Resource.org is allowed to continue; the Commission’s pleading 
that it needs to prevail because otherwise it will have to stop publishing 
annotations or spend taxpayer money to do so is strange when the 
annotations are not freely available to the public anyway. Though 
details of the contract between the State of Georgia and LexisNexis 
have not been publicly disclosed in the litigation, it seems that 
LexisNexis is already recouping the costs of creating the annotations 
and other supplemental material by selling print and online copies of 
the (actually annotated, unlike the free online version) O.C.G.A.; even 
if LexisNexis doesn’t retain ownership of that material under the 
contract, it is still profiting from producing it. 
The necessity that the Commission is claiming becomes more 
dubious in light of the publishing practices of some other states. 
Consider Minnesota, where a private publisher creates and sells an 
annotated version of the statutes129 while the State publishes an official 
version both in print130 and online,131 without any copyrighted material 
                                                
127 See supra Part III.A. 
128 Georgia is in the 11th Circuit. Court Role and Structure, UNITED STATES COURTS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/court-role-and-structure (last visited May 
14, 2016). 
129 Minnesota Statutes Annotated, LEGALSOLUTIONS.THOMSONREUTERS.COM, 
http://legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com/law-products/Statutes/Minnesota-Statutes-
Annotated-Annotated-Statute--Code-Series/p/100028621 (last visited May 14, 2016) 
(stating the retail cost as $8,323.00). 
130 Statutes-2014 Full Set, MINNESOTA’S BOOKSTORE, 
http://www.comm.media.state.mn.us/
bookstore/mnbookstore.asp?page=viewbook&BookID=81734&stocknum=14347&CatId
=280 (last visited May 14, 2016) (stating the retail cost as $255). The State of Minnesota 
specifies that this is one of two official versions. About Statutes, OFFICE OF THE REVISOR 
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confusingly mixed in. Either way, the public does not have free access 
to the annotations, but in the case of Minnesota, the public does have 
access to an official version. 
Despite the various arguments available to 
Public.Resource.org, it seems likely that, should the litigation proceed 
to judgment, the Commission will prevail and the matter will result in a 
decision with a narrow scope based on applying cases that hold 
supplemental material copyrightable.132 Public.Resource.org has 
demanded a jury trial,133 and it is possible that public policy arguments 
about what ordinary citizens should be able to expect when seeking 
legal information might resonate with a jury, but if the judge thinks that 
the law compels a resolution in the Commission’s favor, jury-friendly 
arguments may not be enough. A judge, even if sympathetic to public 
policy arguments and larger implications of democratic and 
constitutional principles, may find the thrust of precedent inescapable 
and may prefer to leave the policy determinations to appellate courts 
and legislatures.  
Even if the matter is resolved in Public.Resource.org’s favor, 
it would remain to be seen whether the court would use reasoning that 
focuses on the idea of governments as creating works made for hire, 
with the people as the owner of the law, or on broader democratic 
ideals of an informed populace and due process requiring that people 
have access to the laws that govern them. The latter would be the better 
reasoning because it would be based on foundational democratic and 
constitutional principles and it would not leave the uncopyrightability 
of the law open to new creative attacks.134 This case should be seen not 
as a run-of-the-mill copyright infringement case but as an important 
challenge to the scope of the principle of the people as the source of 
government and law. 
                                                                                              
OF STATUTES, https://www.revisor.leg.state.mn.us/statutes/?view=info (last visited May 
14, 2016). 
131 2015 Minnesota Statutes, OFFICE OF THE REVISOR OF STATUTES, 
https://www.revisor.leg.state.mn.us/statutes/ (last visited May 14, 2016). The State of 
Minnesota specifies that this is one of two official versions. About Statutes, OFFICE OF 
THE REVISOR OF STATUTES, https://www.revisor.leg.state.mn.us/statutes/?view=info (last 
visited May 14, 2016). 
132 See supra Part II.B. 
133 Answer at 1, Code Revision Commission v. Public.Resource.org, Inc., No. 
1:15CV02594 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 14, 2015). 
134 See supra Part III.B.2. 
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In addition, a finding for Public.Resource.org could push 
states like Georgia135 to change publishing practices in ways that would 
avoid suits like this in the future. Until Georgia creates an official, 
authenticated version of its code that is accessible to the public, 
preferably online pursuant to a UELMA-based law, it cannot claim that 
the annotated code at issue in this case is protected by copyright. As the 
official version of the state’s code, it is in the public domain, even 
though it contains additional material that might otherwise be 
copyrightable. Georgia is not complying with the due process and 
democratic public policy concerns underlying the principle of the law 
as in the public domain. This is an unnecessary situation in today’s 
world, where websites are commonplace and some states have shown 
that it’s possible to provide this information without relying on private 
publishers who have competing interests.136 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
It is generally settled that the law is not subject to copyright, 
and yet, even in a time of proliferation of governmental and legal 
material online, provided directly by governmental bodies, copyright is 
used by governments and private entities to restrict access to the law. 
This is an access-to-justice issue that can be solved with little fuss; 
many state governments have already done so by adopting UELMA 
and putting official, authenticated primary law online. This means that 
an organization like Public.Resource.org would have no reason to copy 
the material, and if it did copy the material, it would not be subject to 
an infringement action. 
The Public.Resource.org case illustrates the ongoing issues in 
this area. The case ought to come out in favor of Public.Resource.org 
because the public policy principles of democracy and due process 
behind exclusion of the law from copyright protection are extremely 
important, and the State of Georgia is pushing against such policies by 
continuing to publish its official code as it does. However, it seems 
                                                
135 See generally GLASSMEYER, supra note 3 (surveying the state of access to state 
primary legal material). 
136 See supra note 59 (describing the availability of official and unofficial Minnesota 
statutes in print), 130–31 (describing the availability of official Minnesota legal 
information in print and online, without the involvement of a private entity); see also, 
GLASSMEYER, supra note 3, at 6 (finding that most, yet not all, of the reviewed online 
versions of the law were unofficial). 
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likely that the court will follow precedents holding that annotations to 
primary legal material are copyrightable and so find that 
Public.Resource.org is infringing by copying and distributing them. 
Such a decision would be to the detriment of the public, which needs to 
have reliable access to accurate versions of the laws that govern it. To 
have otherwise flies in the face of ideals of democracy and due process. 
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